"The golden age" and the crisis of the family in Europe from 1960 to the present day

WOMEN'S LABOR AND ROLE STEREOTYPES

Economic growth in Western and Central Europe in the 50s, late 60s and early 70s.has generated a steady demand for women's labor. Women make up 37 to 43% of all workers in industrialized countries in Europe. While the proportion of women in the total number of employed has not changed significantly, a trend has been registered in all European industrialized countries to increase the number of married women engaged in professional work. In the Federal Republic of Germany, 40% of women who married in 1962 at the age of 25 to 30 years worked for hire. After 10 years, already 48% of all married women of this age group worked. By 1982, their share had grown to 59%.Similar growth rates were calculated for older age groups. The number of working married women with children increased from 1950 to 1970.to a greater extent, the number of working women without children. Of course, the share of working married women falls significantly as the number of their children increases. Labor outside the home affects the relations of reproduction.(A 1976 study of the "birth biography" of all Austrian women between the ages of 15 and 60 showed, for example, that women who did not want to leave or interrupt work had an average of 1.5 births per woman who worked only temporarily, - 1.84, for never working women - 2.31 births

Statistics show that more and more married women deliberately continued to work despite marriage and maternity, but they also reflect the fact thatMotherhood and labor are still difficult to combine. The number of women employed in the specialty of married women is not least explained by the growing share of women's professions that require high qualification, they provide a high level of self-identification, in part, primarily in the civil service, allow them to occupy a certain position. The range of women's professions has changed radically:in industry fell from more than 50% to 30%, the proportion of female employees( primarily in health, education and culture;as well as in state and municipal administration) has increased more than tenfold since the beginning of the century. Although most women are still among the categories of low-paid workers, these structural changes point to the transition from wage labor as a temporary "work-up" to full-fledged work in the specialty, which increasingly allows women to self-identify and get satisfaction from work. The increase in the number of women employed for hire, not on a case-by-case basis, but on a permanent basis throughout life, has exacerbated the structural contradiction between traditional family life and the out-of-home work of married women and mothers.

More and more women in limiting themselves to the roles of housewives and mothers see a monotonous and poor way of life as social contacts.

The main purpose of the work of hiring married women in the 20-30s or 50s.was clearly "family-oriented"( the majority of women worked to supplement the family budget, as the earnings of husbands were not enough).In the 1970s, personal motives came to the forefront. Women say that they want their work to provide their own income, relative independence from their husbands, to receive satisfaction from the profession or to expand social contacts that arise in professional work.

The growth of the professional interests of married women, in no small measure, reveals the fact that with the increase in life expectancy after the separation of children, at least 20 years remain, when in the changed conditions the question of meaningful activity again arises. At the same time, changes have taken place in the world of work, which significantly limit the possibility of professional growth after a long break in work. In the XVIII-XIX centuries.in most families, children lived in the home until the parents died. The role of the housewife and mother remained for the rest of her life self-sufficient, exhaustive and exhausting. Today it is not. Due to the sharply increased life expectancy, decrease in the marriageable age and low birth rates, the change in the phases of family development and the life of an individual has changed significantly. The child who was born last leaves the parental home when the mother is not yet fifty years old. Almost 20 years after this, the couple is married to a household without children, in an "empty nest".That is why marriages break up in this critical phase, which has become a frequent phenomenon in recent years. On average, a woman loses her husband when she is 69 years old, and then lives for about nine years as a widow. The problems of searching for the meaning of life, isolation, mental and social crises arise with growing acuity. The triple burden of motherhood, housekeeping and work is taken up by many women, if we ignore the material and social incentives, bearing in mind the prospect of this phase of life "after parenthood," reconciling with the expected widowhood or considering the increased risk of divorce.

The multiple burden of working married women is due to their inadequate exemption from domestic work and family, or, from a historical point of view, a delay in adapting the roles of men and women to social structural change. Of course, the traditional "sex roles" and the "bourgeois family" model in the late 1970s increasingly fell under the fire of psychologically and sociologically informed criticism. The women's movement demanded gender equality and sought to implement it within the framework of the "private" family sphere. The opening of secondary and higher education for girls and women promoted awareness and discussion of the status of women in society and in the family. No doubt, the public discussion has, at least for part of the population, questioned the traditional notions about the roles of the sexes. But recent studies have consistently confirmed that recruitment, evaluation, and practical role-playing behavior have only marginally adapted to the increased labor activity of married women. Everywhere, his wife is busy cooking food and daily servicing of children, regardless of whether it works or not. The resolution of problems arising in relations with the kindergarten and the school is mostly taken up by women. Caring for the elderly parents, organizing family holidays and the like also largely belongs to the sphere of women's tasks. A typical man still feels distracted from his role as the main "breadwinner", primarily responsible for the external sphere of activity: for example, a "paper war" with the authorities. In the farm, he will soon be engaged in necessary repairs( which has the advantage that it happens irregularly and gives the opportunity to demonstrate technical competence) and will take care of the car. This applies to the husbands of working women. Conducted in the mid-70's.in Austria among young working mothers, the study showed that issues related to the household are more likely to be solved by women, while contacts with extraneous families by persons and important economic tasks are carried out mainly by husbands.

In the 60-70's.at a time when the "division of labor" between a man and a woman was constantly discussed in public, the proportion of husbands who significantly assisted their wives in housework increased only marginally. On the contrary, it seems that the participation of men in the upbringing of children increased somewhat more. The professional work of husbands, meanwhile, is absolutely priority, the participation of husbands in the upbringing of children takes a subordinate position in relation to it. Requirements and needs of professional life, striving for unlimited professional duties, high physical and mental stress at work, etc.limit the opportunities for men in the upbringing of children. In practice, education remains in women's hands. The "feminization" of public education and pedagogy that took place after 1945 gave public support to this form of the division of labor. This is reflected in the prevailing moods of the population. In 1974, an empirical study showed that 65% of the men surveyed believed that they were in principle less suitable for raising children than women. These judgments retain their vitality, not least because of the ways in which they enter the consciousness of people. Daughters still help their mothers in their household work three to five times more often than their sons. True, with the reduction in the number of children, it was common practice, as early as the 1940s, to teach the eldest daughter to the quasi-Dimaternic role in relation to brothers and sisters almost completely disappear, and the mother, apparently, can be expected to weaken the upbringing associated with the preparation for the role of the mother. On the other hand, the educational activity of mothers in relation to children has significantly increased. Probably, this stereotype and gender-specific type of behavior( although against the will of mothers) was stimulated by the dominance of women in the process of socialization. In any case, the idea of ​​a "natural" division of male and female responsibilities in the family does not only arise in marriage, but is inherent in children and adolescents. However, surveys of young people show that the change in these ideas has started. According to a survey of Austrians between the ages of 14 and 24, 82% of girls and 66% of young men believe that the husband should participate in the household if his wife works. Of course, the survey reflects the position of the respondents before they marry. Their actual everyday behavior in the family is quite another matter. Ideal representations and everyday reality in the field of domestic work often differ greatly from one another.

A clear change in the inherited role stereotype is traced in the professional orientation of the female part of the youth. So, for example, a study conducted in Germany in 1982 showed that for girls between 15 and 19 years the realization of their professional desires is in the first place, and only then the family and motherhood. The change in views reflects the increased demand for the labor of girls and women. In the 70's and 80's. For the first time for the majority of girls and young women, it became possible to consider their own professional activities as an essential element of life planning, rather than consider it a transitional phase before marriage and the birth of children. Of course, most of the girls interviewed plan to interrupt their work for a short time to provide childcare( the "three-phase model"), then return to work, combining it with family life.

All recent studies have shown that the prevalence of the traditional role stereotype is correlated with social status and educational level. In the lower strata more often and more definitely adhere to the traditional way of behavior than in the middle and higher. For example, in the 1973 study on women's wage employment in the FRG, 13.2% of women workers and only 6.8% of employees stated that their husbands did not approve of their work outside the home. With the statement "The mother must always be in the family;even if the children grew up, she finds enough satisfaction in caring for her husband and children "agreed to collect data for the second federal report on the family in 1975, almost a third of school graduates, but only a tenth of applicants or graduates of higher education. Apparently, the stereotyped idea of ​​the roles of the sexes is weakening more rapidly in the higher, more educated strata of society.

Without a doubt, the requirement of compatibility of hired labor and motherhood is a central element of the process of emancipating women in European industrialized societies. However, one should not lose sight of the fact that the liberation of women from patriarchal structures can occur only when the right and practical opportunity of her participation in public and political life will be recognized and enforced with the woman's right to paid work. But the work of women, who are mothers and housewives, still leads to overloads that make this impossible. This triple burden often limits social and political activity and thereby impedes the development of the personality of many women, rather than stimulating it. This applies in particular to the majority of those working married women who, in low-wage groups, perform work requiring low and medium qualifications. Their sufferings at work compensate for the insufficient earnings of their husbands;here one can not speak of emancipation as a result of participation in work for hire. In addition, the wage labor of the wife in no way "automatically" increases the participation of husbands in the work of the house, the care and upbringing of children. Therefore, the emancipation of women through their involvement in wage labor can be successful only if the division of labor in the household and family changes, the conditions of labor itself in the direction of increasing its role in social identification and its meaningful purpose.

FAMILY AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

The choice of a marriage partner, freed from the calculations of the parental family, although "individualized" and "personalized", but in no way became independent of the influence of society, as its impact on society did not cease. And in the "postindustrial" society, the family is the main agent of the formation of social strata. Marriage and birth create social structures that are valid for decades: they place an individual in a particular social place in society. The choice of marriage partners follows the social patterns to the extent that they sum up all the marriages that have been established to create relatively stable status structures in society. The intention to marry precedes, at least for most people in European industrialized countries, a long process of orientation and "sociocultural adjustment" of a person to marriage and family. In this sense, the family reproduces people who were originally determined to start a new family( with the growing number of people who grew up not in traditional families, the resulting "self-evidence" of marriage and family creation in the trend is weakened by a well-known choice between alternatives).

Presumably, the choice of partners occurs as a filtering process. First, the category of socially suitable partners is determined. This happens almost "unnoticed" for a person in a social environment where he or she rotates. Then there is a specific choice from the "aggregate" of possible partners in accordance with psychological, sexual-erotic and aesthetic mechanisms. In this aspect, the choice of a partner does not take place as a single act of making a decision, but as its participation in social processes. As far as we know, at the same time, great importance is attached to impressions made from the family, education and early professional careers of adolescents and young people. Empirical studies, for example, have shown that school failures and early retirement from school, like the disappointing professional experience of the first labor years, have stimulated a propensity for early and often insufficiently deliberate marriages. Longer and more successfully completed school education, on the contrary, contributes more to the formation of more diverse needs and expectations in later life, which, apparently, should lead to a more solid relationship when choosing a marriage partner. But awareness of the problems, the level of which increases the education received and their public discussion, also contributes to the fact that it is young people whose entry into working life is postponed by a longer education, often call into question monogamous and legitimate marriages.

The quality of relations in the family is not the least and is largely determined by the size and nature of the available apartments at its disposal. The lack of residential premises experienced by the lower strata increases the potential of intra-family tension, conflicts and aggression in comparison with the families of the middle and upper strata. Forced in most European industrialized countries in the 60-70-ies.social housing construction failed to level out the effect of inequality of life chances, which is generated by the laws of the capitalist housing market. Studies have shown that the level of inadequate provision of accommodation in the Federal Republic of Germany increases parallel to the growth in the number of children per household and a decrease in family income. In 1973, only 33% of the families of unskilled workers, and at the same time 55% of families of ordinary officials and 76% of families of persons not engaged in hired labor, named for each child a separate room.

The historical fact of the family's release from production functions should not overshadow the fact that, in the historical division of work from the family, professional work outside the home still has a significant impact on family life. The experience gained at work, as well as the way and degree of recovery of the working forces of working family members, significantly affect family everyday life. They determine which values ​​are shared and consciously or unconsciously passed on to the children by working parents. Social inequality at work affects the family, taking the form of differences in educational patterns, conflict resolution strategies and leisure needs. Today it is proved that work experience largely determines the social opportunities of people, their needs, preferences and principles. This, in turn, affects the process of family socialization and thus leads to the preservation of social inequality. One of the most characteristic differences stems from what the working members of the family are dealing with at work - mostly with people or with things and cars. In contrast to the assumptions of early research( the "theory of compensation"), those people whose work is characterized by monotonous, uninteresting activity, only occasionally seek compensation in the form of a diverse and independently directed activity in their family life. Much more often, the pattern of behavior at work is transferred to leisure. Parents understand and generalize the pattern of behavior they learn at work, transfer it to the non-professional sphere, including family life and communication with children. Basil Bernstein pointed out the possible links between the forms of spoken communication at work and language socialization in families. Other studies reveal a link between the impressions received at work by fathers and the types of conflicts between fathers and children in the family. It is also likely that the upbringing of children by working mothers is influenced by their experience at work. The harder their working conditions, the sooner they are inclined to educate their children's ability to adapt and obedience. In comparison with housewives, working women demand from children both greater adaptability and higher achievements. Perhaps, by this they want to prepare children for working conditions in production. Shift and night work, apparently, has the most unfavorable consequences for family life, in general, and for the relationship between parents and children. Various researchers agree that shift and night work introduces the most hindrance to family life;in order to harmonize it with the rhythm of daily family reproduction and especially with the relationship between parents and children, readiness is required for concessions from all members of the family.

ABOUT TRENDS IN THE "MISSING FAMILY"

The fact that increasingly urbanized living conditions have the property of weakening social ties between generations and relatives has already been noted from a one-sidedly pessimistic point of view by traditional criticism associated with the study of large cities and industry. And often put in a causal relationship with the assertion of the loss of the family of its inherent functions. Together with them, the stabilizing effect of the so-called "big family" was allegedly lost. Under the "big family" basically understood a family consisting of three generations of a peasant or artisan, who was mistakenly considered a universal type of family of the XVIII-XIX centuries. Industrialization and urbanization, as stated in this thesis, led to an increasingly frequent separation of spouses and thereby more and more frequent formation of a "small family".This led to a loss of continuity, since the "small family", unlike the continuously existing family farms of peasants and artisans, with the achievement of children of adulthood again disintegrates and appears as a married couple, i.e.only a "residual family".The thesis of the thesis about the "compression" of the "pre-industrial big family" and the emergence of the industrial familie conjugate "(" conjugal family "), adopted in old sociology, which went back to Emil Durk-Geymu, was not altogether accurate. Historical demography and family research show that families of three generations in a large number were formed only in the demographically transition period of the late Х1Х-early XX centuries.due to the so-called "agrarian revolution" and industrialization, when for the first time life expectancy has increased sufficiently and the age of marriage has decreased.

With the reduction of the peasant population, the share of families of three generations began to decrease again in the first half of the 20th century. Conditions in which, for example, during the interwar period and immediately after the war, three generations lived together, were perceived as constraining and limiting. Contrary to the similar assumptions of researchers about their special stability, a family of three generations of peasants was highly conflicting. She, however;in the conditions of weak development of commodity-money relations there was no alternative. In cities, families of three generations most often appeared in the crisis decades between 1910 and 1940.As a rule, these were forced communities, necessary to survive the times of labor migration, unemployment, housing need. Once the income and housing market allowed, young couples and families sought to leave the house they shared with their parents and relatives as soon as possible and live their own home. The reduction in the birth rate and the period of the upbringing of children in the first two decades of marriage led to the fact that the "nuclear family" in the so-called "phase after parenthood" was again reduced to a married couple. From this point of view, the "nuclear family" looks more like a transitional stage, whereas marital relations are characterized by comparative constancy. The associated tendency of growth of cultural significance and growing autonomy of the couple in relation to family and relatives has remained in recent decades.

Analysis of the composition of private households shows that in the 70s.the tendency was to form a "small" or "married family", whereas the number of "extended families"( especially groups of parents and children increased by co-living grandmothers, grandfathers or other relatives) decreased. If in 1957 another 7% of all families in West Germany consisted of three generations, then in 1981 only 6% of those were. The average size of the family has decreased, among other things, due to the tendency towards the formation of a small family. This corresponds to the results of surveys about the preferred form of the family: most Austrians, for example, would not like to live with their parents or relatives. Parents also often do not want to live under the same roof with married children. They prefer to live their home for as long as possible. In urban families, older people express a desire to live with their children only when they have lost their spouse or need outside care. Hence, it can be concluded that the existing extended family farms are most often driven by economic necessity rather than based on the preferences of family members. The joint economy of the old and young, as summed up by numerous studies, Leopold Rozenmire, "is divided not because of the negative attitude of the younger generation, the elderly want very rarely, and much less often than actually takes place."The more opportunities for parents and their grown children to live separately, the faster this happens. Conversely, in small villages where religious traditions are still strong and there are not enough living spaces( in single-family houses, which parents and children often built and funded), there is social and ideological pressure in favor of a three-generation life together. However, it would be incorrect from the desire of generations to lead a separate economy to draw a conclusion about the weakening of their human relationships. On the contrary, much speaks for the fact that only the increased possibility of separate residence creates a prerequisite for a positive emotional coloring of the Relationship between parents and their adult children. All the studies conducted to date show that most people, building relationships between generations, tend to "a combination of proximity and distance."

Higher household income, a broader supply in the housing market, aimed at supporting the family state redistribution of funds in recent decades, seem to have contributed to the fact that it is much easier for young married couples and families to realize the concept of a "nuclear family".In addition, an increasing number of working women live with their relatives and because in the 1960s and 1970s, The number of places in children's institutions that contain communal and land authorities( kindergartens, etc.) has sharply increased. Working mothers, they are increasingly replacing their mothers and mother-in-law, who had previously looked after children.

From the clearly expressed tendency to live a "small family" it is necessary to distinguish the issue of the nature of mutual visits and assistance. Family ties and especially communication with the family remain in the future, but mainly performing the functions of supplementing and supporting a small family. Relationship in general became less binding. In the conditions of mutual economic independence of generations there is a choice: to support them or let them fade. In the upper part of the middle layer, the tendency to a greater activity of mutual visits by acquaintances in comparison with related contacts is first of all revealed. It also unequivocally speaks in favor of increasing the possibilities of choice. They are more often looking for contacts with those with whom there are common interests and it is possible to share experience than with those with whom there is only "genealogical relationship".

It should be added that it is possible to talk about the tendency towards a "married family" only when the preferred form of the so-called "full" family is considered;in general, there is much more pronounced at the present time, on the one hand, the tendency to "single-parent families", in particular to the families of divorced and separated women with children, and the trend towards premarital conjugal life and a similar life with the cohabitation on the other.

REDUCTION OF THE FIRM

During the XX century.the general tendency to reduce the birth rate in the first 60 years experienced several times the short-term fluctuations, which either had the opposite direction or intensified it. These tendencies in the development of fertility primarily reflect the reaction of people to acute threats to their material existence in the phases of economic crises and during both world wars, as well as the pronounced "catching effect" in the phases of economic growth and social stabilization. The reduction in the birth rate was not an expression of "cultural decadence", nor a sign of the decline of the peoples who experienced it, as many thought. It was a belated reaction of people to the industrial revolution. The gradual expansion of mass wage labor, which occupied the place of labor in the household, the development of means of communication and trade, led to a radical change in the forms of life. With the expansion of the industrial-urban way of life among the ever-growing part of the population, with the creation of a developed system of social security, children lost their economic importance.

If in 1900, on average, a woman in Western and Central Europe had about four more children, by the end of the 30s.sweat rate fell to about 1.5.Many people reacted to the global economic crisis, taking into account the difficult economic situation postponing the time of marriage and the birth of children. The family policy of the National Socialists was an attempt to fight against low marital activity and unwillingness to have many children: by assisting the family through the redistribution of funds at the state level, they led a massive propaganda of the family and family fertility. However, the disintegration of society and high military losses led ultimately to a noticeable "decline in the birth rate."Only during the so-called post-war "boom" of the 1960s.the number of births again increased on average to 2-3 children per family. Demographers and politicians were surprised at this unexpected boom of fertility, as it contradicted the general tendency to reduce it. Today, however, it does not appear to be "a reversal of the trend in the opposite direction," but the highest point in the development of the family in European industrial societies:

"For the generation of pre-war and post-war children, the existence of a family from social privilege has become a social norm," or,for the first time in the years of the so-called "economic miracle", every adult and adult citizen got an opportunity to marry and have children, not being for economic reasons forced to "postpone" this decision. Among those born in 1940-1945.married 90% and almost as many children. The average age of marriage fell, as did the average age of parents when the first child appeared. Often the first pregnancy was the reason for marriage: the number of children born out of wedlock fell. Never before in Europe was the share of a married and having children so large. Therefore Patrick Festi called the 60-ies."The golden age of the family" in Western and Central Europe. But by the same token, the highest point of family development in European industrial societies has also been achieved, as we now know. Since the mid-60's.the number of marriages and the children born in the family again decreased, and from year to year the number of marriages disintegrated. The birth rate( ie the number of children born per year per thousand inhabitants) has fallen since the mid-1960s.until the late 70's.in most industrialized countries by 30-40%, and in the FRG and GDR, even by 50%.The average number of children per adult woman decreased here to 1.4.Only in a few industrialized outskirts of Europe( Ireland, Turkey) the number of children continued to be high. The statistical reduction in the birth rate reflects, first and foremost, a decrease in the number of children in the family, i.е.per woman and, consequently, a decrease in the family, and to a lesser extent a tendency to total childlessness. Four or more children in the family were in the 70's.in the industrial countries of Western and Central Europe, a rare exception;the number of families with three children also significantly decreased. As a consequence, the phase of births in the family cycle was limited to a short period, always at the beginning of marriage. Reducing the number of children was facilitated by effective contraceptives, especially tablets. Tablets were the first truly effective remedy. They can not see the cause of the birth rate that followed the boom in the mid-1960s.its new fall( erroneously so far called "pills caused by pills" - "pills"), so.as in 1964 the tablet was taken by only a small minority of women, in 1970 - only one in ten women of childbearing age.

If other proofs are needed that talking about "pillerknick" is at least a crude simplification, then we should remember about the decline in the 20-30-ies.half the number of births, when there were no tablets or any similar reliable contraceptives. The need to limit fertility is largely based on a complex combination of objective and subjective factors that, in indissoluble unity, determine the general tendency to "modernize life."The desire of an increasing number of women not to stop working, increased demands for housing and quality of leisure seem to be the most important reasons for reducing fertility. Young married couples foresee the material difficulties associated with raising children, the increased cost of housing and a temporary break in the earnings of his wife. Children are not needed either as a labor force or as grants of security in old age. For emotional enrichment, which the husband and wife expect from their children, one or two are enough. An increasing number of people entering Iraq can imagine a "happy life" even without children. Life in big cities offers alternatives to traditional "family happiness": free time, consumption and professional success are the main components of the "post-industrial" lifestyle, its implementation in the presence of children is more difficult.

The intention of wives to limit the number of births is divided, partly for the same reasons, by husbands. Studies have shown that between the respective desires of husbands and wives there is an exceptionally close agreement. To a certain extent, the decision to have children in a larger number of pairs comes together, i.e.corresponding representations with the rest of the highlights, which are crucial already in the partner selection phase.

While the number of children born in wedlock has declined, the number of illegitimate children has increased in almost all industrialized countries. As the birth of a child out of wedlock has lost its features of shame, since the 60s.the number of unmarried mothers was growing. It should also be remembered that the social conditions for unmarried mothers have changed decisively. The measures of family and social policy increasingly facilitate the unmarried mothers in the case of pregnancy to refuse "forced marriage".Most unmarried mothers live today under conditions similar to marriage, which are later often legally registered. The number of children living with one of the divorced parents also increased. In 1972, there were 364,000 such children in the Federal Republic of Germany( 2.6%, in 1961 - 1.86%).Since 1961, the number of broken marriages with two or three children accounted for a third of all divorces. Already, the Federal Family Report of 1975 predicted that the number of children who are to grow in the "incomplete", according to traditional beliefs, family, will continue to grow."Principle of the manufacturer", according to which physiological parents should be the social educators, if possible, experiences increasing pressure. More and more children grow up with one of the parents who is not a physiological father or mother( repeated marriages of divorced, married life, similar to marriage, etc.).The more often the "producer principle" is violated, the more it ceases to be the norm. This, in turn, favors a further increase in the number of those who are not married or divorced, because the chances of divorced individuals with children to re-marry are increasing. The attitude of children to their biological parents as social parents is no longer taken for granted, they are increasingly involved in the processes associated with the acquisition of a new partner by their physiological father or mother. The newest data confirm this: more and more children grow up with only one of the physiological parents. In 1985, 12 million young children lived in Germany together with both parents, 1.3 million with mothers, fathers, stepfathers or stepmothers, who are usually called "single parents".The fact that single fathers or mothers often live in new( unregistered and therefore not reflected by statistics) relationships that also affect the lives of their children, statistics is silent. The official concept of "single parent" is therefore misleading.

INCREASE THE NUMBER OF DIVORCES

Reduction of the birth rate since the mid-60's.was accompanied by a steady increase in the number of divorces. In the late 60's.mainly marriages concluded during the war years, often in conditions when people did not have sufficient opportunities to get to know each other / Many marriages did not survive the extreme burdens of the post-war period, a long separation due to military captivity, etc. Those who got divorced soon married again. This applies primarily to men who, due to the large number of deaths, were a "scarce commodity" in the marriage market. In the 50-ies.the percentage of divorces decreased. Around 1960, at the highest point of the process of strengthening the family, while the marriage boom continued, the percentage of divorces was low. Then from the early 60's.the number of marriages was gradually decreasing, and the number of divorces increased spasmodically. Currently, almost every third marriage in the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria and Switzerland is disintegrating. In large cities, this is almost every second. Thus, the percentage of divorces is almost twice as high as in 1962. Sweden and Denmark currently have the highest divorce rate( about 45%).In England today, four out of every ten prisoners of marriage fall apart( 39% of divorces).Expect stagnation or reverse trend is unlikely.

With the increase in the number of divorces, the propensity for marriage in all western industrialized countries has declined. In Germany, the number of prisoners per 1000 inhabitants of marriages declined from 9.4( 1960) to 5.9( 1982), although during this period people of high birth-rate cohorts reached the age of marriage. The probability that a young unmarried person will ever marry, back in 1965 in most European countries was about 90%, and between 1970 and 1980,fell in Austria to 70%, in Germany, Switzerland and Denmark - almost up to 60%.

When answering the question about the reasons for this trend, it is first of all necessary to talk about two factors of long-term historical significance: increasing the duration of marriage and increasing economic opportunities for its dissolution. The average duration of marriage for a hundred years has doubled. The couple, married in 1870, lived together on average 23.4 years, in 1900!- 28.2, in 1930 - 36, in 1970 - 43 years, if it did not disintegrate earlier.

Such a prolonged marriage increased the likelihood of more frequent and qualitatively different conflicts. In addition, the hopes that people place on families and marriage went beyond pragmatic survival and expanded to the expectation of comprehensive happiness.

Decrease in the strength of marriage is primarily economic and related psychological causes. A growing number of people live and work in the conditions of agricultural or craft production, where the joint ownership of the means of production compels them to maintain an unhappy marriage. Those groups to which this does not apply, namely peasants and individuals engaged in independent crafts, show a much lower percentage of divorces. Peasants and peasants are almost never divorced. The less spouses in their economic and social life are connected with each other, the sooner they can raise the issue of divorce in the case of an unhappy marriage. Therefore, the work of wives raises readiness and economic opportunity for division or divorce in problem marriages. Townspeople with secondary school or secondary technical education, who are in the position of employees, are bred most often;the lowest percentage of divorces among non-working women. Finally, the declining or stagnant average number of children per family increases the willingness to divorce, since the presence of children in a couple reduces both their subjective desire and the economic possibility of divorce. Other factors that increase the willingness to divorce are the reduction of marriages contracted by the religious rite, the growth of urbanization and regional mobility, changes in the role of women and the further "individualization" of the life concept.

To the same extent, in which more and more broad segments of the population are primarily a matter not of economic necessity but of a personal relationship of love between spouses, liberalization and the general attitude to divorce, as well as the legal norms governing divorce, should be based on marriage. When love became the decisive motive in choosing a partner, the conviction gradually spread that marriage ceased to be a marriage, "if there is no more love in it."People's hopes of finding a "great happiness" in marriage are likely to increase despite all the symptoms of the crisis. Last but not least, this is the result of a media discussion about the possibilities and limits of "personal happiness", "romantic" love, free from material pressure. Thus, there were developed needs for emotional security, sexual happiness and loving communion in marriage, which can be satisfied in an incomparably lesser degree than the hopes of the peasants, artisans and burghers of previous generations, who in any case saw the basis of marriage in "pragmatic" love,joint livelihoods, property guarantees and status. The wide propaganda of romantic love as the sole "legitimate" motive of marriage hides the fact that this romantic love, as a rule, lasts only for a certain time. It is not strong enough for the concept of marriage, concluded until the end of days.

Marriage is not primarily a sex-erotic institution. The required stability is achieved not by choosing an object for fragile human sexual relations and eroticism, but it follows from the need to ensure the socialization of children and economic existence. Common children, housing, income, joint ownership of various objects of use and, last but not least, ignorance of divorce procedures force people to reconcile themselves to the contradictions of "romantic love" and monogamous marriage, showing personal restraint and discipline. It is to be hoped that "romantic love" in marriage will turn into "pragmatic love" or "friendship".These hopes, however, are often not justified, as the divorce figures prove. Even when it is possible to transform the "honeymoon" relationship into a union of life associates, marriage remains largely under threat. The gradually accumulating lack of emotional support, sexual satisfaction and tenderness in the relationship of the spouse is seen especially clearly against the backdrop of a permanent demonstration of attractive examples of "romantic love".Increasing the independence of the individual and recognizing her emotional, social and sexual desires have their price: the stronger the couple is oriented toward the ideal of a "loving couple," the more often it disintegrates due to the competition of a new "romantic love".

For the purpose of reviewing the historical development of the family, the question of the importance of constant growth over the last two decades of the divorce rate is too complicated. Does he characterize the crisis state of marriage and thereby increase the threat to the existence of the family, or does he relate to the level of dissolution of unhappy marriages? For us, it is important that divorce is the final point of the crisis development of the couple's relationship. It is usually preceded by a long process of disorder of relations. What is the number of "nelozhivshihsya" marriages in the end disintegrate, depends on many personal and social factors. In all likelihood, judging by the increased needs, over the past two decades, more and more marriages are "upsetting," and more and more people are ready to admit to themselves and their environment that they consider the marriage to be disintegrated, because the public condemnation of the divorced is rapidly declining. It seems that in a wide range of people, the willingness to accept a marriage, from which "love has gone away," or a too conflicting marriage, has decreased. With the increase in the number of divorced social resistance divorces fall. The more divorced people live in society, the sooner those who wish to divorce and the divorced can rely on an understanding of their problems. The reaction of the social environment to divorce is an essential factor in the decision of the spouses.

An Austrian study found that the dissolution of a "shaken" marriage is generally approved if there are no children in the house. Two-thirds of the respondents still spoke in favor of keeping the marriage going to disintegration "for the sake of children".This proves that the task of socialization is subjectively also at the center of family life. The widespread view that in principle the spouses should not divorce, if the family has children, still misses the question that can be answered only individually: what the children suffer more from - the ongoing "marital

dispute "of the parents or from their divorce. Divorces of conflicting couples are approved the more, the younger the person and the more urban environment he lives in. People with a lower level of education divorce as the norm rather reject. Divorce is a sign of an urban way of life. In comparable professional groups, the frequency of divorces in cities is two to four times higher than in rural areas. Women are more likely to approve of divorce than men. This is surprising, given the divorce-related deterioration of their economic situation. On the other hand, the explanation is that women are more likely to endure the conflictual nature of married and family life. In addition, in case of divorce, women have, from a psychological and social point of view, the advantage that children basically stay with them. This usually gives them emotional support. At the same time, young children often complicate the mother's attempt to enter into a new relationship. In most cases, the initiators of divorce are women, although men are the "true agents" of divorce and are the first to try to break the bad relationship. In general, it seems that women have higher demands for marriage and family than men, they also often express dissatisfaction with their marriages.

Based on the view that divorce is the result of a process that often stretches for years, it is interesting to ask what factors play a role in it. Statistically, the first increase in divorces is observed soon after the wedding, when usually there are no children yet. It seems that we are talking about an early correction of the "mistake" made when choosing a partner, and more often, perhaps, about the difficulties of adapting to the way of life of the spouse. During the birth and care of young children, divorces occur much less frequently. But at this time there is often a crisis in the relationship of the couple. Numerous studies show that after the birth of the first child, a decline in subjective satisfaction with marriage occurs, and moreover, in a comparable degree in men and women. Spouses have less time for each other, they have less common friends and acquaintances than before. Young mothers start new contacts with other mothers, in which husbands do not participate for the most part. Young mothers often feel lonely and abandoned due to falling out of the social system related to the profession, many lack a sense of independence. On the other hand, family contacts( primarily with the families of the husband and wife) in this phase are increasing again, which is more conducive to the orientation toward traditional relations between spouses and between parents and children. Often, the demands for joint responsibility for a housekeeping, sustained in the spirit of emancipation, are presented only before the birth of the first child, and then they enter into the channel of traditional models of the division of labor or completely cease. Therefore, it is young women who experience a painful discrepancy between the desired ideal of marital and family life and the daily routine. Their hopes for a "partner marriage" do not come true. When the youngest child turns 6-14 years old, it becomes gradually possible to unload the parents from intensive care of children and in the conflict marriages the readiness for divorce again increases.

So, the open manifestation of the conjugal crisis is preceded, as a rule, by a hidden preparatory period, which some do not realize by the participants. In most cases, this is a slow process of marriage degradation affecting both spouses. One French study also showed that divorce is often preceded by repeated attempts to disperse. First of all, because of children or for financial reasons, the couple always postpone the decision to divorce. Finally, when children grow up, the financial situation improves or the process of degradation of marriage intensifies, they enforce it. At the same time, the readiness to take into account the divorce depends on the social status of the spouses: in marriages where women work, talk about divorce is more frequent. The professional activity of women as such does not increase the degree of risk. I ^ against, empirical studies have shown a higher degree of satisfaction in couples where a woman has an "independent" sphere of work and life, with which a circle is associated in acquaintances and friends. It should, however, be assumed that the financial independence of working women( especially in the middle and upper strata) contributes to the fact that conflicts in marriage are more often brought to an end and, with discontent with marriage, divorce is more often discussed. The lowest readiness to bring the case to divorce, on the contrary, is shown by the inhabitants of agrarian regions, unemployed women, as well as by representatives of the groups of the population with the lowest incomes. Divorce means for them, for the most part, life outside the subsistence minimum.

In general, from the briefly presented data of social studies on the "nature of the process" of divorce and, accordingly, the period preceding it, we can conclude that the decision to divorce is usually not taken hastily and irresponsibly quickly, as opponents of divorce often claim. The constantly used argument that divorces violate children's right to peaceful family socialization is true, on the one hand, primarily in the sense that many parents who live or divorce, even after the divorce, "carry" their conflicts "to children."On the other hand, at the same time, the public aspect of the problem is lost: in industrial societies, the most important function of the family - the socialization of future generations - is ensured only if the parental couple lives in fairly harmonious relationships. Divorces are not a "pathological" phenomenon of modern societies: they are, in a positive sense, functional if they manage to stop the destructive crisis trends in the relations between the two people by changing their life situation and return them after rather long conflicts related to divorce, as personal ability to enjoy life, soand readiness to participate in the life of society as far as their strength and ability. In any case, one should not lose sight of the fact that women in the event of a divorce are often deprived, because they have to combine domestic work, childcare and often work in a largely degraded economic environment. Their practical opportunity to find a new partner is usually limited, as is the psychological willingness to decide on new love relationships.

Some experts in the field of family sociology believe that the tendency to increase the number of divorces, taken by itself, does not inspire fears until most of the divorcees conclude new marriages. Divorce is, in principle, only an indirect compliment to the ideal of modern marriage and equally an indication of its difficulties. "Such statements show that many times the sociologists who have developed pessimistic cultural concepts repeatedly declared by older generations, condemnation of divorces now, in the light of the latest trends, is not divided. On the other hand, one should not obscure for the sake of an elegant sociological formulation those misfortunes that are connected with the divorce of a married couple, its disintegration and their consequences, in the current socio-cultural and economic conditions. It would be naive to hope that the dissolution of marriage / causing suffering, aggression, a passion for domination and submission, will only give liberation and do no harm. Figures of divorces already show only the tip of the iceberg. Together with the divorced by the law, it is necessary to assume the presence, first of all, of a significant number of couples who actually split up, and secondly, an unknown number of unfortunate ones, but because of children or for economic reasons or social reasons for unbroken marriages. In addition, the observations supporting this judgment refer to the 1940s and 1960s, when the majority of the divorced sought to marry, and today, at least as a general rule, are not confirmed. The number of newly married people in most countries does not increase and does not decrease, while the number of divorces increases. In 1950, Paul X. Landis, given the high percentage of repeated marriages, introduced the term "sequential marriage", referring to the consistent polygamy of men and women. It seems that the sociocultural pressure, which was previously subjected to divorce and which often led to an early resurgence, is now weakened.

ALTERNATIVES OF MARRIAGE AND FAMILY

A minority that is skeptical about the institution of marriage is growing numerically. A survey conducted in Germany in 1978 showed that approximately 18% of all unmarried people seem attractive to stay "basically independent and independent."In 1981, in a youth survey, 13% of young respondents answered that they did not want to marry, and 7% did not want to have children. Since then, apparently, skepticism has grown even more. Presumably, mainly it is generated by the experience of young people, taken out of their families and observation of the marital problems of their parents. This increases their willingness in their own lives to seek alternative forms of its organization.

In parallel with the reduction in the number of marriages being contracted, especially in the North of Europe, in Sweden and Denmark, and in the 1970s.and in the states of Central and Western Europe, forms of cohabitation, similar to marriage. More and more people prefer not to marry at the very beginning of their relationship or not to marry at all. This changed position has, to a large extent, relevance to the change in the sociocultural nature of the phenomenon of "youth".The classical phase of youth between the onset of puberty and full socioeconomic maturity( often associated with marriage) has now changed. Young people, above all middle and upper social strata, reach socio-cultural maturity long before they gain economic independence from their parents. On the one hand, the entry into the working life of the young has been postponed because of the lengthening of the term of school and university education( and often the next phase of unemployment).On the other hand, at an earlier age, preference is given to the ability to act and consume. The "postindustrial" society favors the early coming of age - especially in the field of consumption, as well as in social and sexual relations, and postpones the onset of economic independence( as in working adults).Young, not yet becoming producers, are already consumers.

Competent participation of young people in consumption makes them more mature from the socio-cultural point of view than it was in previous generations. The phase of mature years( somewhat indistinctly called "post-youth" phase) is determined, on the one hand, by a higher readiness for life-long experiments, on the other hand, by limited economic independence. Formulating more precisely: young people remain economically fully or partially dependent on their parents, but behave, apparently, independent of the normative representations of the latter, especially in the sociosexual sphere.

Hence the conflicts between generations, even though most of the parents become more tolerant. Therefore, often the post-youth phase passes outside the parents' home, young people declare a historically new "right of refusal" from their parents. When a young man or a girl at a certain age says: "I'm fed up and want to leave you", this is a situation that has become increasingly possible in recent years. The parental home is not suitable for experimentation. The young man faces the question of how he will live outside his walls. If in the 60s, at the highest moment of the global trend of strengthening the family, more and more young people "ran" into marriage( early marriages), then since then, the youth environment has adopted an increasingly wait-and-see attitude toward marriage and family. The concept of "bourgeois marriage" seems to be too heavy and callous in those years."Marriages without marriage certificates", "residential communities" and independent lonely life are the alternatives developed to date. Apparently, they offer the best opportunities for learning about life and facilitate the break of existing relationships.

Unmarried couples. In Denmark and Sweden already in the mid-70's.approximately 30% of unmarried women between the ages of 20 and 24 years lived with men. Therefore, the non-marital union in this age group is more common than formal marriage. In most other European countries in the same period, only 10-12% of this age group were cohabiting, but later the number of unmarried couples living together here also increased. This applies primarily to large cities and their environs: in Paris in 1980, less than half of all heterosexual couples living together( with men aged 25 or less) were married, among couples with men aged 35 and below,if they did not have children, only about half were painted. In the FRG in 1985, approximately one million couples conducted the so-called "non-spastic family life".They can be correlated with about 15 million married couples with or without children.

Is cohabitation often only a preliminary stage to a subsequent marriage( "trial marriage"), or are we dealing with a historical alternative to marriage? Preliminary and not quite confident, I would answer: it's true that both. Joint life in the "trial marriage" as a whole lasts for a relatively short time the marriage either consists, or the relations are interrupted. At the same time, the number of cases of cohabitation, which differs from marriage only in the absence of legal registration, is increasing. If couples try to avoid conception in test marriages, then in a marriage of a long-lasting relationship, the birth of children is often welcomed.

Meanwhile, the public acceptance of "trial marriages" is much higher than long-term cohabitation. Forms of joint long-term cohabitation, similar to marriage, appear to have spread primarily in countries where trial marriage was already common. The normative effectiveness of legitimate marriages is receding, so to speak, step by step. In Sweden, pre-marital cohabitation is already a recognized social institution. Almost all married couples lived together for a while before marriage. Marry only by tradition. With marriage, in no way do not bind the public sanction to the sexual relationship of the couple. Marriage has lost the meaning of the legalizing sexual relationship of the couple of the act. The situation is similar in Denmark. Here cohabitation after a while is also given a legal character by marriage. Most unmarried women with one child get married before the birth of the second.

The bulk of extramarital first births occur in women who live in similarly-married unions. More than 98% of these women still get married when the child grows up. Part of women consistently enters into several unformed unions. At the same time, the "trial marriage" is practically transformed into "consistent polygamy", which, however, does not exclude some hopes for longer relations.

"Experimental" forms of life require a higher level of reflection and communication ability, and not least the forces that can resist the pressure of social norms. For this reason, their distribution can not but depend on social belonging and educational level. It is known that in France similar forms of cohabitation are more common in the higher social strata than in the lower ones. True, for the most part they represent there a short-term phase preceding marriage. The average duration of "cohabitation" was in the late 70's.in 18-21-year-olds 1.3 years, in 22-25-year-olds - 2 years and in 26-29-year-olds - 2.7 years. In the mid-70's.in France, as in Austria, about half of all married couples lived together for a while before the wedding. In Germany, about a third of all married couples "tested" their ability to live together until they began to trust each other. Since then, the number of such "trial marriages" seems to have increased significantly. Polls in Austria showed that a joint life without a marriage certificate as a "trial marriage" is recognized in a wide range of people. However, apparently, the majority of the population( still?) Rejects the final replacement of marriage by "free cohabitation."Probably, this is hardly justified now by sexual and ethical arguments, but, rather, solely by the interests of possible children.

Single. Since the Second World War, the number of individuals living alone has risen sharply. In 1950 in Germany each fifth household consisted of only one person( 19.4%);in 1982, almost every third( 31.3%), in large cities with a population of more than 100 000 - almost every second household. In Berlin, in 1982, more than half of all households were single people( 52.3%), in Hamburg in the same year they were 40.6%.In all taken together urban regions, i.e.excluding the countryside, 31.3% of West German citizens lived on farms consisting of one person. In Austria, there were 27% in 1984.At the same time in Germany there were about 8 million households of single persons. What is behind these figures?

To live alone is a historically new phenomenon. Anyone who before the Second World War was unmarried, widowed or divorced, usually lived in crowded families( from parents, relatives, etc.).The sudden change occurred especially in large cities. The growing proportion of single people in the FRG includes, along with more than 3 million widows( 40.7% of all single people), a growing percentage of young and middle-aged people living apart. 1 Along with 1.5 million unmarried women and 1.4 millionIn 1982, unmarried men were also self-employed, and 1.3 million were legally or actually divorced. More and more men and women in a "marriageable" age decided to live alone: ​​in 1982, no less than 1.1 out of 7.5 million farms were led by single men aged 25 to 45 years. These people have decided for various reasons to live alone;from the point of view of social infrastructure, this is made possible by a developed network of services and technical assistance in large cities. However, statistics do not know anything about the relationship of loners.

The majority consists, apparently, in more or less long relations with someone. Many spend part of their time with partners, without giving up their own apartment. This increases personal independence and frees the relationship from the effects of uneven distribution of work on the household between a man and a woman. The minimal economic pressure in favor of maintaining relations and the fact that lonely people do household chores on their own, unless they assume that they bring dirty underwear to mothers or friends, create space for overcoming patriarchal structures.

Residential communities. Criticism of the social functions of the family, associated not only with the reproduction of labor and ensuring the integrity of society, but also with the stabilization of existing relations of domination, in the early 70's.gave rise to attempts to oppose her alternatives